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ABSTRACT 
Advertising avoidance has long been considered as an active elimination of ad effect after 
conscious processing. However, recent research demonstrates that ignoring (passive 
avoidance) is also a common strategy used by Internet viewers when they encounter a 
distracting ad. The act of ignoring due largely to our limited processing capacity (Lang, 2000) 
induces unconscious processing of ads, which are found to negatively affect subsequent 
evaluation of these ads. This process is named “distractor devaluation” in both cognitive 
psychology (Fenske & Raymond, 2006) and advertising research (Duff & Faber, 2011). 
Recent advertising research demonstrates that when ads are embedded beside a central task, 
people tend to ignore them when focusing on the task. We examined how people's evaluation, 
familiarity and memory of an ad differ when they were faced with interactive web games that 
differed in cognitive and perceptual load. We find that memory, familiarity, and evaluation of 
peripheral ads only declines with perceptual load. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
    Advertising researchers and professionals have long investigated internet banner ads. 
Past advertising research has developed general or specific understandings of the traditionally 
embedded Internet ads (e.g., Ilfeld & Winer, 2001; Dreze & Hussherr, 2003). Researchers 
have always been trying to look for the reasons why consumers avoid traditionally embedded 
Internet ads (e.g., pop-up ads, banner ads). Some researchers concluded from their findings 
that the “cluster-bomb” approach of Internet ad placement, which emphasizes quantity and 
intense exposure, follows the failures of their ad predecessors in traditional media (Zanot 
1984; Cho & Cheon 2004). 
Different from ads in traditional media, which can be predicted and actively avoided by 
viewers (e.g., TV commercials), Internet ads are sometimes unpredictable or highly 
embedded into web content. For example, it is hard to predict the appearance of pop-up ads. 
Internet viewers may ignore the ads, which is characterized by inhibition of distractor ads in 
order to focus on the task (Duff & Faber 2011). Through ignoring, Internet viewers inhibit 
much of the ad content without filtering its essential features. Those features could potentially 
act as a memory cue that induces devaluation of the ad since it distracts the viewers from 
focusing on the task. Raymond, Fenske, and Tavassoli (2003) found that participants’ 
goal-oriented attention leads to their devaluation of non-goal stimuli. They defined this 
phenomenon as "distractor devaluation". They proposed that such devaluation might be 
triggered by an inhibition mechanism, through which the memory traces encoded by the 
viewers were used as a clue for inhibition. Thus, if the ad is completely and consciously 
avoided, no memory trace will be left to provoke such inhibitory mechanism. Therefore, 
exposure which is meant to enhance the ad and brand could actually be harming consumers’ 
cognitive and affective reactions toward that ad and hence, the brand in the ad. 
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What is even more intriguing is that when consumers are performing distinct kinds of 
tasks, their devaluation of ads may be different. It is easy to imagine that sometimes Internet 
viewers cognitively process web information (e.g., reading blogs, finding information); 
whereas sometimes they are more involved in perceptual tasks (e.g., searching photos in 
Google). Those two conditions may exert different influences on their memory of distracting 
stimuli. Perceptual load is defined as the required demand of attention to fulfill perceptual 
distinction (Lavie, 1995; Lavie, 2005; Lavie& Tsal, 1994). Cognitive load is defined as the 
load dealing with certain tasks, which exploit the learner’s cognitive system, especially 
working memory (Engle et al., 1999; Kyllonen, 1996; Paas & van Merrienboer, 1994). Lavie 
(2010) states that under high perceptual load, the interference of distracting stimuli 
diminishes; however, distractors interfere more under high cognitive load than under low 
cognitive load. This finding provides a potential moderator of Internet ad devaluation. If 
distractor devaluation diminishes under a certain type of task load and meanwhile the ad 
leaves implicit traces in consumer’s memory, then advertisers can focus on advertising their 
brands in places where viewers often need to use such load. It is also helpful to examine what 
kinds of memory traces will be left in viewers’ mind when they are under perceptual and 
cognitive load, and how useful those memory traces are for remembering the brand 
advertised and for ad liking. 
Although abundant research has been done in the realm of cognitive psychology 
exploring how different loads lead to distinct memory performance and attitude change, the 
advertising literature falls short of examining this basic but important domain. Discovering 
how load differences induce various patterns of ad processing promises new insight into 
unconscious and peripheral ad processing, which is important for traditional ad placement. 
Therefore, this research examines people's processing of advertising when they are under 
perceptual or cognitive load. Participants were assigned to Internet tasks with primarily 
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perceptual or cognitive load. Their evaluation, familiarity and memory of the distractor ads 
were tested afterwards. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Influence of Emotion on Attention 
     Emotion and attention have long been studied as a pair of reciprocal constructs. An 
abundant amount of research has focused on how emotion influences attention. Through the 
filter of motivation, attention can prioritize people’s thoughts and behaviors by expediting the 
processing of motivationally relevant stimuli and blocking irrelevant stimuli (Fenske & 
Raymond, 2006). Firstly, emotionally salient stimuli alter the allocation of attention (Fenske 
& Eastwood, 2003). For example, negative stimuli are found to have privileged access to 
attentional resources (Carretie et al., 2001). Emotionally salient stimuli are also more easily 
identified than neutral or novel stimuli (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003). Emotional stimuli, even 
when acting as distractors or peripheral stimuli, also attract attention (Vuilleumier, Armony & 
Dolan, 2003). Secondly, emotional states can influence the allocation of attention (Fenske & 
Eastwood, 2003). Emotional state is thought to be one possible standard for judgment of 
visual competition, which finally allocates attentional resources to the more competitive 
regions (Desimone, 1998). Such attentional resource allocation is regarded by Desimone 
(1998) as a mechanism involving complex processes such as top-down process (e.g., 
motivational or goal-directed search) and bottom-up process (e.g., salient stimuli attract 
attention). Very different from the attention enhancement model and the classic “spotlight of 
attention” model, in which attention is described to enhance the response of neurons focusing 
on relevant location or to move quickly and serially in order to find the relevant object, 
Desimone’s “biased competition” model suggests that the enhanced response of neurons is 
the result of competition between independent objects in the visual field. Competition is the 
strongest when objects appear in the same local region of cortex. Motivation, which involves 
top-down search process, and emotional salience, which involves bottom-up process, are both 
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guidelines for allocation of attentional resources to resolve biased competition between 
different stimuli. 
    Emotion does not only alter attentional resources, it is also influenced by allocation of 
goal-directed attention (Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003). This influence will be 
discussed in the next section. This research is inspired by the influence of attention on 
emotion or evaluative/affective responses. 
 
2.2 The Influence of Attention on Emotion 
     Fenske and Raymond (2006) recently summarize the influence of attention on emotion. 
Several aspects of such influence are mentioned. One of the most important influences is that 
the ignored stimuli are devalued. Raymond, Fenske and Tavassoli (2003) find that the state of 
attending to or ignoring an affectively neutral visual stimulus influence later evaluation of 
this stimulus. Previously ignored stimuli are judged more negatively than the previously 
attended stimuli and completely novel stimuli. Thus, they conclude that “active ignoring 
produces the affective devaluation” (p. 539). Another important finding is that it is selective 
ignoring rather than selective attending that can exert influence on emotion. This is because 
the affective ratings of previously attended stimuli and the completely novel stimuli are not 
significantly different from each other. Since perceptual tasks are applied in this research, 
Raymond, Fenske and Tavassoli (2003) suggest that goal-oriented (or top-down) perceptual 
processing is linked with emotional processing even when the perceptual task does not 
involve affective evaluation. 
Negative priming is also thought to be related to devaluation of distractors. Eight years 
before Raymond, Fenske and Tavassoli’s research, Tipper and Cranston (1985) suggest a 
“negative-priming” construct. They define “negative-priming” as a phenomenon when “the 
naming of probes related to the ignored primes is delayed” (p.591). They find that when 
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participants ignore a certain stimulus on trial N, their response to that same stimulus in trial 
N+1 is impaired. Moreover, spatial relationships such as distance between the attended and 
ignored objects influence the degree of negative priming. It is found that when the attended 
and ignored object are superimposed or integrated into one object, the impairment of memory 
of the ignored object is not significant; however, when spatially separate from the attended 
object, the ignored object is likely to be suppressed in later trials. Tipper and Cranston (1985) 
also find that when the distractor is interfering and the selective attention task is demanding, a 
negative priming effect is likely to be observed. 
     Raymond, Fenske and Tavassoli (2003) suggest that the devaluation of previously 
ignored stimuli results from an inhibitory mechanism. More specifically, the signal of 
attentional inhibition, which is acquired when a certain stimulus should be ignored, is stored 
with its representation, and is re-instantiated when that previously ignored stimulus is 
encountered again. 
 
2.3 Distractor Devaluation: Concept 
     As mentioned, people tend to devalue previously ignored stimuli. The term devaluation 
indicates simply “stimuli seen under some conditions are valued less than similar stimuli 
under other conditions” (Fenske & Raymond, 2006, p. 7). With regard to devaluation, a 
noteworthy fact is that devaluation does not necessarily mean absolute negative rating; rather 
it is more suitable to describe devaluation as “affective neutralization” (p. 7), which is 
characterized by a reduced emotional salience of previously ignored stimuli. Thus, it should 
be separated from attitudinal changes due to conscious affective experience and reasoning. 
The difference between consciously negative experience and reduced emotional salience is 
that the former one is generated after conscious thoughts and reasoning (e.g., Internet viewers 
negatively rate distractor ads because it blocks the web content they want to see), while the 
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latter one is largely caused by memory impairment and has nothing to do with absolute 
negative attitudinal change. Since the former advertising and psychological research has not 
divided clearly these two different conditions, whether a rating is a mixture of either two 
factors or just one of them is largely unclear. The assumption may be that ratings that are 
significantly lower than the neutral point is an indicator of absolute devaluation; ratings that 
are around the neutral point are indicators of devaluation caused by reduced emotional 
salience. 
Empirically, distinguishing those two kinds of devaluation is meaningful. Absolute 
avoidance, which has been researched by many researchers such as Cho and Cheon (2004), is 
split into cognitive, affective and behavioral processes. Cho and Cheon (2004) consider 
cognitive processing as the starting point of avoidance behavior. They assume that previously 
unfavorable experience leads to intentional ad avoidance. Such intentional avoidance is 
characterized by completely shutting down the window of ad representation. Internet viewers 
often generalize the devaluation of a certain Internet ad to that of Internet ads as a whole. 
When the ads cannot be actively blocked from sight, absolute devaluation can still happen. 
When the ad is not avoidable and viewers have to wait for it to disappear, viewers may 
cognitively process the ad content and devalue the ad through the process proposed by Cho 
and Cheon (2004). The two aforementioned types of absolute devaluation are severe enough 
to cause negative affect towards the brands advertised on the Internet. 
When the ads are not very distracting but still get some peripheral attention, they are 
likely to be inhibited rather than avoided. Inhibition does not necessarily lead to negative 
ratings but to affective neutralization (e.g., positive/neutral rating that is significantly lower 
than the ratings of a novel ad). Memory impairment, which is characterized by partial and 
limited memory, and response time lag are two important indicators of such inhibition. Such 
devaluation is not as severe as the first two types since it does not involve an absolute 
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negative evaluation; however, it may reduce the effectiveness of Internet ads, in terms of 
explicit brand awareness (Robinson, Wysocka, & Hand, 2007) and informational/purchase 
pursuit (Baltas, 2003), or click-through rate (Hanson, 2000). Awareness is impaired since 
only a limited part of a banner ad is peripherally processed. 
 
2.4 Distractor Devaluation: Research 
     Raymond et al. (2003) conducted research on the potential effect of selective attention 
on emotional evaluation. Participants evaluated abstract visual patterns that they encounter in 
a two-item target localization task. The stimuli to be rated included the target stimuli, the 
distractor stimuli and novel stimuli. They found that the previously ignored stimuli were rated 
significantly lower than novel and target stimuli. 
     Raymond et al. established an inhibition paradigm for their findings. Stimuli compete 
for attention in a top-down search process. The stimuli that are irrelevant in this process are 
stored with their representations in the memory. When such stimuli or stimuli similar to their 
representations are encountered again, the inhibition is rearoused, leading to affective 
devaluation. Raymond et al. (2003) make several important points concerning this paradigm. 
First, more than inhibiting perception of the distractor stimuli (Moran & Desimone, 1985) 
and preventing responses from being under the control of the distractor stimuli (Tipper, 
Brehaut, & Driver, 1990), the top-down search process even involves emotional processing. 
Second, this paradigm argues that it is the action of ignoring rather than attending that causes 
devaluation. Third, the emotional processing is independent of affective evaluation, which 
means such processing happens even without externalization of emotion. They find that when 
the ignored items become the target stimuli, they are still inhibited and the response time is 
lower than that of novel stimuli. 
     More research has been done based upon this inhibition paradigm. Fenske, Raymond 
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and Kunar (2004) examined how previewed distractors are inhibited in the subsequent 
complete visual display. They established a preview condition, where half of the distractors 
were presented for one second before the search display with a complete set of distractors and 
target, and a non-preview condition, where all distractors and target were simultaneously 
presented. The results showed that people were generally more efficient in finding a target 
when they previewed part of the distractors. According to Watson and Humphreys (1997), 
this finding can be explained by a pre-established inhibition of the distractor’s visual 
representation. Thus, reduced response time in the preview condition results from the reduced 
number of competitive distractors. This finding supports the aforementioned inhibition 
mechanism. It is suggested by Fenske et al. (2004) that inhibition of previewed distractors 
reduce the emotional salience of those distractors and hence alleviate the competition 
between distractors and target. 
     Raymond, Fenske and Westoby (2005) found that a distractor near the target was more 
devalued relative to one far from the target. This finding is in conformity with the proposal 
that limited capacity of visual processing may be the cause of less devaluation of the far 
distractor since they are less sufficiently encoded than did the near distractor (Bahcall & 
Kowler, 1999). According to Bahcall and Kowler’s findings, locations where people pay 
attention are surrounded by an inhibitory region; the region dies down from the place near the 
target to the place far from the target. 
    Goolsby and colleagues (2009) suggest that the inhibition mechanism of distractor 
devaluation is feature-based rather than object-based. They find that when participants 
identify the distractor by using a certain feature of the distractor, their subsequent affective 
ratings of novel objects with this feature are lower than objects that are not endowed with 
such feature. Thus, they conclude that people use features of a peripheral or distractor object 
as cues to guide them in the selective attention process. In favor of Feature Integration 
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Theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), Goolsby et al.’s (2009) findings also propose that the 
inhibition of distractor stimuli can be interpreted as a prevention of individual feature maps 
from contributing to localization and formation of the master map, which is an object-based 
conjunction of localized features extracted from the overall feature maps. 
    Goolsby, Shapiro and Raymond (2009) find that distractor devaluation is eliminated 
when participants are under high visual working memory load. They thus suggest that the 
inhibition mechanism involves working memory capacity. If the working memory resources 
are exhausted by the demanding task, the inhibition process cannot be activated. 
Panagiotidou’s (2010) finding suggests that selection response – to-be-rated stimulus interval 
(RSI) can exert potential influence on distractor devaluation. The data demonstrate that: first, 
distractor devaluation is not significant when the RSI is larger than 6600ms; second, tasks 
with higher error rate induce more persistant distractor devaluation. 
 
2.5 Distractor Devaluation Research in Advertising Field 
     Although distractor devaluation is potentially important to the advertising field, little 
research has borrowed this concept and its mechanism to enrich the viewpoints of advertising 
researchers/professionals and the strategies of advertising placement. 
     Several reasons illustrate the importance of distractor devaluation in advertising 
research. First, mere exposure effect may not happen when people are repeatedly exposed to 
distracting ads which they are likely to ignore. Zajonc (1968) defined mere-exposure effect as 
the phenomenon that "mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus object enhances 
his attitude towards it" (p. 1). The belief in mere-exposure effect drives advertisers to expose 
consumers to ads whenever and wherever possible. This can be generally reflected by a 
continuous increase of internet advertisement expenditure (Business Week, 2004). Research 
that approves the effectiveness of banner ads in increasing brand awareness and purchase 
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intention (Ilfeld & Winer, 2002) provides rationale for increasing ad exposure on the Internet. 
However, such approach may involve fatal flaws since ads surrounding a certain task may be 
considered as distractors and will probably be devalued. Second, the placement strategy of 
Internet banner ads is becoming less related to instant effectiveness such as click-through rate 
but more related to brand recognition (Dreze & Hussherr, 2003). Therefore, the role for 
today's banner ads is more for brand recognition, familiarity and positive attitude formation. 
From this perspective, the concept of distractor devaluation makes more sense since it 
involves peripheral or even unconscious processing of ads (i.e., form familiarity and increase 
recognition) rather than processing of ads as a focal interest (i.e., read or click through the ad 
to see what it offers). Therefore, advertisers need to know the gist of distractor devaluation in 
order to readjust the goals and strategies of placing banner ads. 
Several advertising research has explored ad devaluation when ads served as distractors. 
It has mainly examined the influence of task-distractor similarity, task difficulty, and 
task-distractor distance on devaluation (Duff, 2009; Duff & Faber, 2011). Duff and Faber 
(2009) examined the influence of goal-directedness and ad repetition on subsequent ad 
devaluation. Results showed that: first, a positive effect of ad exposure only happens when 
the viewers have no task at hand; second, goal-directedness reversely influence ad liking; 
third, the effect of distractor devaluation occurs when participants perform a certain task; 
fourth, when exposed to a certain task, participants that have high attentional control 
demonstrate lower liking of the ads than those that have low attentional control. Duff (2009) 
suggests that a mere-exposure effect happens when people are not task- or goal-oriented. This 
means that when people are not goal-oriented, ad repetition will result in positive attitude 
change. 
     Duff and Faber (2011) conducted another research with regard to different factors and 
distractor-target relationships that potentially influence distractor devaluation. Visual 
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similarities and task difficulties are discovered to have significant influence on distractor 
devaluation. The more visual similarity between the target items in an webpage and the 
distracting ads, the more distracting effects occur; same is for task difficulties. However, 
distance has no significant effect. A significant interaction effect (on affective evaluation) 
between distance and similarity is also discovered. Duff and Faber (2011) thus suggest that 
visual similarity and near distance between ads and task, which is encouraged in a 
mere-exposure context, may not be smart placement strategies since more distractive ads are 
more heavily devalued. Task difficulty, as suggested by Kiss et al. (2007) to be an important 
factor influencing the level of devaluation, is also found to be an important indicator of 
distractor devaluation in Duff and Faber’s (2011) research. 
    Although recent advertising research has developed applied knowledge of distractor 
devaluation, a research gap is discovered. Next section will discuss the research gap more 
specifically. 
 
2.6 Limitations of Current Advertising Research on Distractor Devaluation 
     Although the concept and mechanism of distractor devaluation has recently been 
introduced in advertising research, it still needs more exploration. 
     An important limitation of current advertising research on distractor devaluation is that 
different devaluation effects on ads caused by different task loads are lack of examination. 
Task load is used as a general term in most advertising research. However, in cognitive 
psychology, task loads are generally divided into perceptual load and cognitive load. These 
two loads, as suggested in the reviews below, are significantly different in their essence and 
their ability to induce distractor devaluation. Since when surfing the Internet, viewers are 
usually involved in either task, devaluation of ads in these two circumstances may be 
different. Duff and Faber (2011) use a newspaper article as the task stimulus; whereas Ho 
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(2011) uses confounding edible and inedible products. Those stimuli, though extracted from 
real life, cannot purify perceptual and cognitive load. For instance, Ho’s (2011) task stimuli 
involves both perceptual and cognitive load, since identifying an edible product and 
distinguishing it from the confounding inedible product needs a combination of perceptual 
features via cognitive processing and memory. 
     This research will mainly explore advertising distractor devaluation in terms of this 
important aspect. The research question raised is: whether task load difference (perceptual vs. 
cognitive load) leads to differences in advertising evaluation, familiarity and memory? 
 
2.7 Cognitive Load and Perceptual Load: Definition, Manipulation and Measurement 
     Cognitive load is defined by Paas and van Merrienboer (1994) as a multi-dimensional 
concept representing the load dealing with certain tasks, which exploit the learner’s cognitive 
system. Some researchers suggest that working memory capacity is the most important factor 
determining people’s cognitive ability (Engle et al., 1999; Kyllonen, 1996). Paas and van 
Merrienboer (1994) also establish a well-grounded Cognitive Load Theory (CLT), which 
provides insight into the development of instructional methods. CLT has several important 
assumptions. First, human cognitive system contains two layers of memory storage, which 
are a limited working memory and a capacious long-term memory (Schnotz & Kurschner, 
2007). Limited working memory confines learner to only a restricted simultaneous 
assimilation of information (Sweller, 2005). Second, information is organized in long-term 
memory as cognitive schemata, which is established to reduce the burden on working 
memory. Third, cognitive load is a construct of the amount of cognitive resources needed to 
fulfill a particular task (Sweller & Chandler, 1994; Sweller et al., 1998). Fourth, cognitive 
load consists of intrinsic load, which is the inherent complexity within a task, extraneous load, 
which is a reducable unnecessary load caused by the design of the task material (Kalguya et 
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al., 1998), and germane load, which is characterized by schema construction and automation 
due to repetitive learning (Sweller et al., 1998). Fifth, learning involves a decreasing 
cognitive load. Besides all those important assumptions, mental load is often mentioned as an 
important aspect of cognitive load, representing the cognitive capacity that is allocated to 
meet the task demand (Paas et al., 2003). 
     Cognitive-load manipulation is divided into hierarchical manipulation, emphasis 
manipulation, goal-free problems, worked-out problems, completion strategy, and expert-like 
problem analysis (Paas & van Merrienboer, 1994). Via hierarchical manipulation, a complex 
cognitive task is broken down into steps or sub-tasks, which require sub skills rather than a 
comprehensive set of cognitive skills (Frederiksen & White, 1989). Gopher, Weil and Siegel 
(1989) apply emphasis manipulation to their research. They vary cognitive load by asking 
participants to handle certain sub-components of a whole task without altering the whole task. 
Goal-free problems are proposed by Sweller (1988), who states that a higher cognitive load 
can be achieved under a means-ends strategy rather than a goal-free strategy. Worked-out 
problems are problems with written solutions or exemplar answers. Cognitive load may 
decrease when attention is redirected to acquire more efficient schema shown by the 
examplar solutions (Paas & van Merrienboer, 1994). Completion strategy, developed by van 
Merrienboer (1990), consists of problems with larger and larger incomplete solutions. The 
amount of cognitive load is simply determined by the extent to which the problem solution is 
worked out. Expert-like problem analysis requires participants to analyze hierarchically 
structured problems such as a list of quantitative questions (Paas & Merrienboer, 1994). 
The measurement of cognitive load has been comprehensively discussed and compared 
by Paas et al. (2003). Rating scales are demonstrated as a method capable of indicating 
perceived mental burden (Gopher & Braune, 1984). Such subjective techniques usually 
consist of questionnaires with multiple scales, which are designed to record subjects’ 
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experienced level of cognitive load (Paas et al., 2003). Those scales usually contain groups of 
assoicated variables, which include fatigue, mental effort and frustration (Nygren, 1991). 
Unidimensional scales can also be reliable measures that are sensitive to nuances in cognitive 
loads (Gimino, 2002). Another set of techniques, according to Paas et al. (2003), is task- and 
performance-based measures. Primary task measurement is usually used instead of secondary 
task measurement. The dependent measures usually used are reaction time, accuracy, and 
error rate. Among all measurements, mental-effort measurement is considered as the best 
estimator of cognitive load (Hamilton, 1979; Sanders, 1979; Paas, van Merrienboer, & Adam, 
1994). This measurement can be realized by rating scales. 
Compared to cognitive load, perceptual load is often considered to be abstract (Lavie, 
1995) in attention research. There is also no a priori definition of the level of perceptual load 
(high vs low) (Torraldo & Beck, 2008). Generally speaking, perceptual load refers to the 
required demand of attention to fulfill perceptual distinction (Lavie, 1995; Lavie, 2005; Lavie 
& Tsal, 1994). Cognitive psychologists usually use low vs high perceptual load to study 
attentional differences. 
Changing display size is an often used way to manipulate low- and high-perceptual load. 
Kahneman and Chajczyk (1983) manipulate low perceptual load and high perceptual load by 
adding adding irrelevant neutral items such as neutral words or an array of xs. Remington, 
Johnston and Yantis (1990) use 2-letter array as the low-load condition and 8-letter array as 
the high-load condition, and provide valid and invalid cues in both conditions. Lavie (1995), 
in one of her experiment, manipulates perceptual load by changing the number of items 
among which the target appeared. Besides display size, Lavie (1995) mentions that in order to 
test the hypothesis of early visual selection and the preattentive processing held by Feature 
Integration Theory (FIT) (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), perceptual load can be manipulated by 
adding shapes with different colors and forms to targets and non-targets. Thus, Lavie (1995) 
 16 
 
incorporate such method in her experiment 2A and 2B. Similarly, Parks, Hilimire, and 
Corballis (2011) manipulate perceptual load by assigning targets that can be identified only 
by color (low load) or by the combination of color and orientation (high load). In a similar 
vein, Torralbo and Beck (2008) mainpulate high perceptual load by putting target letter X or 
N among other letters that share many features with the target (e.g., Y, Z and H). Another 
way to manipulate perceptual load is to change simple detection task into more difficult 
identification task while keeping the appearance of the stimuli unchanged. Lavie (1995) 
manipulate perceptual load by establishing two conditions where the first needs simple 
detection of character’s presence while the second requires participants to judge the size of 
the line or the accurate position of the circle. Measurement of perceptual load often involves 
accuracy of response, error rate and reaction time. 
 
2.8 Perceptual Load and Its Influence on Distractor Processing 
    The perceptual load theory (Lavie et al. 2004; Lavie 1995) combines early- and 
late-selection models of attention. When the perceptual load of a task is high, no spare 
capacity is available for unattended items, resulting in low level processing of unattended 
items (early selection); when the perceptual load of task is low, capacity spills over into 
unattended items, resulting in late selection. Thus, in a high perceptual load condition, 
capacity is fully engaged in the perceptual task, leaving no room for attention to irrelevant 
distractors. For a task with low perceptual load, perceptual capacity that is not currently in 
use will spill over involuntarily to distractors. 
     Lavie and Forster (2008) tested their hypothesis of the influence of perceptual load on 
distractor processing. Participants were required to finish a perceptual task, which was 
finding the letter “N” or “X” in a ring of letters. In the low perceptual load condition, 
participants saw the “N” or “X” in a ring of “O”’s; in the high perceptual load condition, 
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participants saw these two letters in a ring of visually similar letters such as “K” and “L”. 
While participants were searching for the “N” and “X”, they were presented with peripheral 
distractors which were congruent (same as the task stimuli, e.g., N, X), incongruent (different 
from the task stimuli, e.g., L, Y), irrelevant (cartoon characters, e.g., Sponge Bob), or no 
distractors at all. They found that: first, under high perceptual load, the interference of all 
kinds of distractors (congruent, incongruent, irrelevant) diminishes; second, task-relevance of 
distractors had no significant influence on distractor interference. 
     According to Lavie and Forster’s (2008) findings, high perceptual load in a central task 
may lead to low memory and recognition and higher evaluation of distracting banner ads. 
Under high perceptual load, distractors’ inference effect diminishes because of lack of 
capacity to process those distractors; however, under low perceptual load, underutilized 
capacity spills over to distractors and leads to a distractor interference effect. Interestingly, 
the devaluation studies in advertising mentioned previously (Duff & Faber 2011; Duff 2009) 
did not specify the type of load used in their task. Because a search task was used where a 
question was kept in mind while they searched for the answer on news websites it would 
likely fit more into cognitive load, but the task appeared to also have some perceptual 
elements. With the above reviewed literature, it seems likely that different types of load and 
different levels of load could potentially affect both cognitive and affective outcomes of ads 
that are peripherally placed.  
Hypothesis 1: Under high perceptual load, game players' liking of the banner ad will 
be higher than that in low and intermediate perceptual load condition. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Under intermediate perceptual load, game players' liking of the banner 
ad will be higher than that in low perceptual load condition. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Game players will feel more familiar with the banner ad under low and 
intermediate perceptual load condition than under high perceptual load condition. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Game players will feel more familiar with the banner ad under low 
perceptual load condition than under intermediate perceptual load condition. 
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Hypothesis 5: Under high perceptual load, game players’ memory of the banner ad 
will be lower than that in low and intermediate perceptual load condition. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Under intermediate perceptual load, game player's memory of the 
banner ad will be lower than that in low perceptual load condition. 
 
2.9 Cognitive Load and Its Influence on Distractor Processing 
     Logan (1978) failed to find any influence of verbal working memory load on the 
efficiency of visual search. Recently, Woodman, Vogel and Luck (2001) continued Logan’s 
(1978) research but used visual working memory load. They still did not find a significant 
influence of cognitive load on visual search efficiency. However, Lavie et al. (2004) found 
that working memory load significantly influences attentional capture, especially when the 
distractor in the visual search set is salient and irrelevant. According to Lavie and De Fockert 
(2004), interference from a distractor is higher when participants are under high cognitive 
load than when they are under low cognitive load. Lavie et al. (2004) predicts that higher 
cognitive load increases distractor processing since the “reduced availability of these control 
mechanisms would reduce the ability to control attention in accordance with current 
processing priorities” (p. 341). Conway, Cowan and Bunting (2001) suggested that working 
memory capacity might be characterized by the ability to inhibit the interference of 
distractors. Their research posed a crucial question: does inhibition of distractors cause an 
impairment of those items in memory, leaving a very limited memory trace for devaluation to 
occur or does it lead to a partial but relatively abundant memory trace that allows devaluation? 
If high working memory span leads to memory impairment of the distractors that is too 
severe, then even devaluation may not occur; if such span leads to lesser memory impairment, 
devaluation may occur since participants can still remember the distractors at some level. One 
potential problem for Lavie's (2004) and Conway et al.'s (2001) research is that they 
operationally defined cognitive load as a secondary task rather than a central task, whereas 
perceptual load tasks generally only involve a central task. In this study, we planned to 
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examine potential attentional and affective differences caused by a central cognitive task. 
    According to cognitive psychology research, higher cognitive load leads to more 
attention to distractors. Therefore, the banner ads placed beside a central cognitive task may 
be more devalued when the task is harder because of more encoding of the distractors; 
whereas memory and familiarity of the distractor may be higher. 
Hypothesis 7: Under high cognitive load, game players’ liking of the banner ads will 
be lower than for those under low cognitive load. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Game players may feel more familiar with the banner ads under high 
cognitive load than under low cognitive load. 
Hypothesis 9: Under high cognitive load, game players’ memory of the banner ads 
will be higher than that when they are under low cognitive load. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
        The pretests and experiment were designed to immerse participants in a relaxed but 
goal-oriented Internet environment where the ads could only be processed peripherally or 
unconsciously. In order to encourage high attentional involvement, interactive web games 
were created as the central tasks. Banner ads, as distractors, were placed near the primary task 
(game) in different locations in the left or right visual field, simulating what typically happens 
with online games. 
 
3.1 Participants 
     Participants (n = 63) from a mid-western university participated in the three pretests. 
One hundred and fifty-four participants from the same university participated in the two 
experiments. Participants were asked whether their ability to identify and distinguish colors 
was normal. Data of the participants who were color-blind or with problems identifying 
colors were eliminated. 
 
3.2 Stimuli 
    The stimuli for the two experiments contained two parts, which were task stimuli and 
distractor stimuli. The task stimuli were interactive webpage games (see Figures 1 and 2), 
which included different levels of perceptual games and different levels of cognitive games. 
The perceptual game (see Figure1) contained a 9 x 9 matrix of squares (each square: 40 
pixels x 40 pixels, 300 dpi) with different shapes (e.g., triangles, circles and rectangles) in 
white color. This game was essentially a shape matching game similar to popular web/mobile 
games like Bejeweled. Perceptual games were manipulated into three levels (easy, 
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intermediate or hard), which corresponded to three different levels of perceptual load. The 
rule of both the easy and intermediate game was to find two identical shapes adjacent to each 
other (either horizontally or vertically), and to click them to make them disappear. The 
difference between the easy and intermediate was that the intermediate game contained a 
larger set size of shapes. The difficult game contained the same larger set size that the 
intermediate condition had, but had slightly more difficult rules: participants had to find two 
identical shapes that had one non-matching shape in between them (either horizontally or 
vertically). 
The cognitive game contained a 4x4 matrix of squares (80 pixels x 80 pixels, 300 dpi) 
with 10-pixel intervals between each square. The cognitive game occupied approximately the 
same space as that of the perceptual game except that it was similar to games of memory or 
concentration. The 4 x 4 matrix of squares contained eight pairs of identical numbers ranging 
from one to eight randomly allocated to each square. When a square was clicked it would 
reveal its number; a second click on another square revealed that number as well. If the two 
numbers from the clicked squares were the same, they stayed visible; if they were different, 
they both flipped invisible after 300ms. The rule was to click and find as many pairs of 
identical numbers as possible. The easy cognitive game contained four pairs of ones and four 
pairs of twos (i.e., (1, 1), (2, 2)). The difficult cognitive game contained eight pairs of 
numbers from ones to eights (i.e., (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)..(8,8)); see Figure 2 for example. 
The advertising stimuli included four ads: an evaluation-related ad for affective 
judgment, a memory-related ad for memory measurement, a familiarity-related ad for 
familiarity ratings, and a colored square. The first three ads were Internet banner ads (width: 
200 pixel; height: 150 pixel; 300 dpi) with four main elements: brand name, graphics, brief 
brand claims, and background color. All banner ads were modified versions of currently 
in-use banner ads. All distractor stimuli were selected from pretesting. Since participants 
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were enrolled in an entry-level advertising class (for non-majors), they may guess the purpose 
of this experiment is advertising related. Therefore, if only the target ads were demonstrated 
on the screen, participants might be likely to pay attention to the ad as the only non-goal 
distractor. The introduction of multiple distractors reduced the distinctiveness of each 
individual peripheral ad and obscured the purpose of the experiments. The colored squares 
(width: 200 pixel; height: 150 pixel; 300 dpi) were used to test whether rudimentary and 
meaningless features such as colors induce devaluation. Since Lavie's (1995) research 
indicated that rudimentary features (e.g., color) are fully processed under both low and high 
perceptual load, it is important to know whether rudimentary features are used as a cue for 
devaluation. Figure 3 illustrates the advertising stimuli used in the two experiments. 
 
3.3 Pretest 
Three pretests were conducted for the following reasons. Pretest 1 was conducted to 
ensure that the perceptual and cognitive games had the same task difficulty. Pretest 2 selected 
banner advertisements as distractors. Pretest 3 checked the task-focus manipulation via 
eye-tracking devices. 
 
Pretest 1 
In pretest 1, perceptual tasks were manipulated into three levels (small set size, low 
competition; full set size, low competition; full set size, high competition), which were 
named "easy," "intermediate" and "difficult" respectively; cognitive tasks were manipulated 
into two levels (easy vs. difficult). During the first pretest, participants were instructed to play 
a sequence of both perceptual and cognitive games and answer a short questionnaire after 
each game. The two cognitive games were inserted into the sequence of the three perceptual 
games to avoid the effect of familiarity on game ratings. A typical questionnaire contained a 
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game difficulty rating scale (a slider from 0 to 100), enjoyment rating (a slider from zero to 
100), cheeriness rating (from 1 “Not at all cheery" to 7 "Definitely cheery"; Raymond, 
Fenske, and Tavassoli, 2003), self-reported attentional-focus (a slider from 0 to 100) and a 
game-finish check (Can you finish the game in X seconds? Yes, I can/Not sure, just busy 
doing it/No, I can't). Cheeriness rating, which was used in Raymond, Fenske and Tavassoli's 
(2003) research, was used as a complement for game enjoyment rating. 
 
Result 
The results from pretest 1 mainly demonstrate significant differences between 
self-reported difficulties of distinct levels of perceptual games and cognitive games. The 
means of the difficulty-level scores for each cognitive and perceptual task are compared via 
one-way ANOVAs. Tests of homogeneity of variance indicate feasibility of ANOVA for both 
cognitive and perceptual game ratings. The easy cognitive game (M = 25.88, SD = 21.13) is 
significantly easier than the difficult cognitive game (M = 48.73, SD = 24.77), F(1, 29) = 7.67, 
p = .01. The difference between enjoyment ratings of the easy cognitive game (M = 38.06, 
SD = 23.82) and difficult cognitive game (M = 50.60, SD = 30.99) are insignificant, F(1, 29) 
= 1.607, p > .20. Similarly, difference between cheeriness ratings of easy (M = 3.19, SD 
= .981) and difficult game (M = 3.60, SD = 1.40) is insignificant, F(1, 29) = .91, p > .30. 
Interestingly, although the difficulty ratings of the two levels of games demonstrate 
significant difference, the subjective reports of the amount of attention focusing on the two 
games (easy vs difficult) are barely distinct from each other (64.56 vs 77.87), F(1, 29) = 2.10, 
p > .15. 
Differences between ratings of the three perceptual games demonstrate roughly the 
same results as for the cognitive games. The small-set-size easy game (M = 27.42, SD = 
25.24) is significantly easier than the full-size strategy game (M = 46.63, SD = 25.90, SE = 
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8.00, p < .02). The full-size easy game (M = 36.41, SD = 30.00) differed neither significantly 
from the small-set-size game (SE = 7.83, p > .25) nor from the full-size strategy game (SE = 
9.27, p > .25). The enjoyment (35.97 vs 40.59 vs 28.50), cheeriness (2.94 vs 2.88 vs 2.44) 
and attentional-focus ratings (67.17 vs 69.82 vs 65.00) of the three perceptual games are all 
fundamentally similar (p > .40). 
As for the question inquiring about finishing rate, the answer "Yes, I can" is coded as 1 
and the answer "No, I can't" or "Not sure, just busy doing it" is coded as zero. About 7.2% of 
the participants report that they they are not able to finish the perceptual game in the 
designated time (15 seconds for small-set-size easy game, full-size easy and difficult game). 
Specifically, 12% of participants reported that they were able to finish the small-set-size easy 
game; 5.9% of participants can finish the full-size easy game; while no participants are able 
to finish the full-size strategy game. Since the number of participants who can finish the 
small-set-size easy game is higher than expected, the time is further reduced from 15 seconds 
to 12 seconds in order to ensure participants' full occupation of attention on the task. Time 
limit for other perceptual games is also reduced to 12 seconds for ease of control. For 
cognitive games, the finishing rate of the easy game is 25% while that of the difficult version 
is 0%. Thus, the time limit for the easy game is reduced from 15 seconds to 12 seconds; while 
that for the difficult version is also reduced to 12 seconds for ease of control. Table 1 below is 
the descriptive statistics of pretest 1. 
Above results, indicate several important points. First, the manipulation of difficulty is 
successful in terms of subjective rating. Except for full-size easy game, the difficulty levels of 
the other two perceptual games as well as the cognitive games are significantly different. 
Second, since the enjoyment and cheeriness ratings are fundamentally similar in both 
perceptual and cognitive games, it is safe to assume that there will be no confounding effect 
of task enjoyment on subsequent evaluative rating of distractor ads. Third, it is interesting 
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that although the above different levels of perceptual and cognitive load are developed 
through references to cognitive psychological research, participants' self-reported load 
differences between each perceptual task as well as between each cognitive task are not 
significant. 
 
Pretest 2 
In pretest 2, 17 participants were provided a list of 20 banner ads each with a brief 
questionnaire attached at the bottom. Each banner ad contained four elements: a 
brand/service name at the upper part, a main graphic at the center, a brief claim at the bottom, 
and background color. Those ads are chosen from various brands in different industries (e.g., 
agriculture, food processing, finance, etc) and are modified by the researcher for the use of 
the experiment. All banner ads and their brands are rated for cheeriness (half reversely coded), 
liking (half reversely coded) and recognition (see Duff & Faber, 2011). Criteria for selection 
of final ads are: 1) low recognition scores; 2) neutral or close-to-neutral liking and cheeriness 
scores. 
 
Result 
A two-tailed Pearson correlation test demonstrates significant relationships between 
liking and cheeriness ratings of all 20 ads (correlation: .65; sig = .002). Therefore liking 
ratings are used as the main gauge for affective evaluation. The affective-related standard for 
selection is .5 standard deviation above and below the neutral point (4.5) in a 9-point scale, 
which results in a range from 3.57 to 5.43. According to this standard, 8 ads among the 20 are 
selected as back-ups. All of these selected ads are low in both brand familiarity (M = 1.13, 
SD = 0.08) and ad familiarity ratings (M = 1.16, SD = 0. 20) on 5-point scales. Table 2 
demonstrates descriptive statistics of each ad in pretest 2. 
 26 
 
 
Pretest 3 and result 
    The eye-tracking pretest (n = 14) was conducted to examine whether overt attention is 
paid to the distractor ads. Fixation is generally considered a measure of overt attention 
(Holmqvist et al., 2011). Before the pretest, 14 participants were seated in front of a laptop 
computer in which eye-tracking software (EyeGuide
TM)
 was installed. The researcher assisted 
each participant to wear a head-mount eye tracker (EyeGuide
TM
). The sampling rate was 
100ms. The visual angles are within 1 degree. The X and Y axis of the gaze plot were 
originally placed at (0, 0) and were adjusted after the pretest. A calibration and validation 
process was done with each participants until the discrepancy between actual fixation and 
ideal fixation is within a certain range was resolved. After calibration and validation, 
participants were instructed to go through a randomly selected game condition of the two 
experiments (perceptual vs. cognitive). In overall gaze plots, 99.75 percent of fixations 
cluster in the game area, which justifies our expectation that participants only engaged in 
peripheral or unconscious processing of distractor ads. 
     
3.4 Experiment 1 
    Ninety-three participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (easy, 
intermediate, or difficult perceptual games). All participants were first instructed to fill in a 
brief questionnaire in which their ability to concentrate their attention was asked 
(concentration questionnaire, section 2 in Study Skill Assessment Questionnaire, UHCL 
Counseling Services; personal control scale, Heppner & Peterson, 1982). The majority of the 
questions were positively phrased and each participant's final score was always 95.7 out of 
100 along with positive comments on their ability to concentrate. The questionnaire was used 
as a positive prime for participants in order to encourage them to focus their attention on the 
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game afterwards. Soon after the survey, participants were seated in front of a desktop 
computer with a simulated Internet environment. They were then asked to read the game 
instruction and go through one 12s practice section in which they practiced playing the game 
before the actual experiment. The practice section was used to increase participants' skills at 
playing the game and to familiarize participants with the setting so that they could be more 
engaged in the game. After the practice section, participants were instructed to finish 32 game 
trials depending on the game they played. Participants who were assigned to the low-load 
condition played a small-set-size low-competition game; participants who were assigned to 
intermediate-load condition played full-size low-competition game; participants who are 
assigned to high-load condition played full-size high-competition game. The assigned time 
(12s) for each trial ensured that the finishing rate was less than 2 percent according to pretest 
1. The rationale for not letting the participant finish each trial was to ensure their full focus on 
the central task. In order to ensure participants were more immersed in the game, the first two 
game trials were without ads. In all conditions, an evaluation-related ad was placed 100 
pixels (300 dpi) away from either the left or the right margin of the game area (each for five 
trials). A memory-related ad was randomly placed in another 10 trials. A familiarity-related 
ad was randomly placed within five trials with memory-related ad and five-trials with 
evaluation-related ad. A colored square was placed along with the appearance of the 
devaluation-related distractor and the memory-related distractor each for the other five trials. 
In sum, in trials that had distractors there were constantly two distractors (evaluation-related 
ad with familiarity-related ad; memory-related ad with familiarity-related ad; 
evaluation-related ad with colored square; memory-related ad with colored square). The 
rationale for this design was to obscure participants with the purpose of this study, in order to 
avoid potential experimental bias. A blank screen for 1.5 seconds was inserted between each 
trial as an indicator for preparation of a new trial. 
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    After the main experiment, all participants were instructed to fill out a brief 
questionnaire inquiring about their evaluation, familiarity, and memory of the ads. 
Participants were not told about this procedure before the experiment, which ensured that 
their attention was not biased towards the distractor ads during the experiment. Participants 
were first asked to select an ad they preferred from a set of two ads ("Please use your gut 
reaction and don't read the ad content. Which ad do you like more?", half were reverse coded 
as "Which ad do you dislike more?"). One of the ads was the evaluation-related distractor ad; 
the other was an ad with the same affective according to pretest 2 (4.58 vs. 4.52, F(1, 16) 
= .021, p = .89). Participants were then told to rate their feeling of familiarity to three ads, 
one of which was the familiarity-related distractor ad and the other two were novel ads 
chosen from pretest 2. Participants then answered a set of multiple-choice questions asking 
them to recall specific elements (e.g., color, brand claim) of the memory-related distractor in 
the experiment. Since the evaluation-related ad, the familiarity-related ad and the 
memory-related ad were different, we expected no confounding influence of each ad upon the 
response concerning the others. Finally, participants were told to rank a list of colors, which 
included the color of the colored square and other new colors that were not used in the ads or 
games. 
 
Result 
    Table 3 contains descriptive data obtained from both experiments. Affective responses 
were coded as binary variables (i.e., if the evaluation-related distracting ad was selected as 
preferred, the score was coded as one; if the novel ad was preferred, the score was coded as 
zero). Binary logistic regression is conducted to examine whether a significant relationship 
exists between affective responses (i.e., frequency of selecting the evaluation-related 
distracting ad as preferred) and conditions. Conditions are used as independent variables; 
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affective responses are used as dependent variables. Result demonstrates a significant 
relationship between conditions and affective responses, -2loglikelihood = 112.42, χ2 (2) = 
14.43, p < .001. This indicates that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to 
zero, which means that different manipulations of perceptual load in the three conditions lead 
to affective changes. Post hoc chi-square tests demonstrate that affective response in 
high-load condition (M = .30) is significantly lower than those in low-load (M = .77) and 
intermediate-load (M = .59) condition, respectively, χ2 (1) = 12.33, p < .001; χ2 (1) = 5.04, p 
< .05. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is not supported. Game players evaluate the banner ad lower in 
high load condition compared with low and intermediate load condition. 
    There is no significant influence of condition on affective responses in low and 
intermediate-load condition, χ2 (1) = 1.64, p > .20. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Game players do not evaluate the banner ad lower in intermediate load condition than in low 
load condition. 
    Chi-square goodness of fit tests for each of the three conditions demonstrate that: 1) in 
low-load condition, the frequency of selecting the target distracting ad as the preferred ad 
(N=23) is significantly higher than the expected frequency (N=15.5), χ2 (1) = 7.26, p < .01; 2) 
in intermediate-load condition, the frequency of selecting the target distracting ad (N=17) is 
not significantly different from the expected frequency (N=14.5), χ2 (1) = .86, p > .30; 3) in 
high-load condition, the frequency of selecting the target distracting ad (N=10) is 
significantly lower than the expected frequency (16.5), χ2 (1) = 5.12, p < .05. The results 
show that under low perceptual load, people's liking of the distracting ad is significantly 
higher than that of a novel ad; whereas under high perceptual load, their liking of the 
distracting ad is lower. Figure 3 is an illustration of affective responses across conditions. 
    A one-way repeated ANOVA demonstrated that the two novel ads in all three 
conditions did not differ in familiarity ratings (ps>.15). The familiarity-related distracting ad 
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is rated significantly higher in familiarity than the novel ads in both low (2.55 vs. 1.29) and 
intermediate conditions (2.07 vs 1.03), respectively, F(1, 30) = 15.03, p<.001; F(1, 28) = 
15.08, p<.001. However, the mean familiarity rating of the distracting ads does not differ 
from those of the novel ad in high-load condition (1.45 vs. 1.09), F(1, 32) = 3.52, p>.05. 
Between conditions, the familiarity with the distractor ads differs significantly, F(2, 90) = 
4.82, p<.01. More specifically, post-hoc multiple comparisons demonstrate that familiarity 
with the distractor ad under low-load (M = 2.55) is significantly higher than that in the 
high-load condition (M = 1.45), SE = .353, p<.005. However, difference between familiarity 
with the distractor ad under intermediate load and high load is not significant, SE = .36, 
p > .05. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is partially supported. Familiarity with the distractor ad is 
higher in low load than in high load condition; however, no significant difference is observed 
between familiarity with the ad under high load and that under intermediate load. 
    No difference is observed between familiarity ratings under low and intermediate-load 
condition. The results indicate that under high perceptual load, the encoding of the ad is 
insufficient for generating familiarity, whereas under low and intermediate perceptual load, 
the encoding of the ad is sufficient for recognition of the ad compared to unexposed, novel 
ads. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is not supported. Game players feel equally familiar with the 
distractor banner ad under low perceptual load and intermediate perceptual load condition. 
Figure 4 is an illustration of familiarity ratings across conditions. 
    Interestingly, ordinal logistic regression shows that only memory of the brand claims 
differs across conditions, -2loglikelihood = 110.09, χ2 (2) = 8.30, p < .05. Although memory 
of other elements (color, graphic, brand claim) did not differ across conditions (ps>.50), 
memory of the brand name is significantly higher in low and intermediate-load condition than 
in high-load condition (respectively, χ2 (1) = 6.90, p < .01; χ2 (1) = 5.34, p < .05). Therefore, 
hypothesis 5 is supported. Memory of the distractor ad is better under low and intermediate 
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load condition than under high load condition. 
    There is no significant difference between memory of brand names and other elements 
under low load and intermediate load condition, ps > .05. Therefore, hypothesis 6 is not 
supported. Memory of the distractor ad is not significantly higher in low load condition than 
in intermediate load condition. 
    Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests demonstrate similar but more specific results for each 
memory elements. In low-load condition, the accuracy of recall of the main graphic (M = .42) 
and the brand name (M = .45) of the memory-related distracting ad is significantly higher 
than chance (.20), respectively, χ2 (1) = 9.32, p < .005; χ2 (1) = 12.27, p < .001. The accuracy 
of recall for the background color (M = .10) and the brand claim (M = .19) is not significantly 
higher than chance (.20), respectively, χ2 (1) = 2.07, p > .15; χ2 (1) = .01, p > .50. Similarly, in 
intermediate-load condition, the accuracy of recall of the main graphic (M = .38) and the 
brand name (M = .41) of the memory-related distracting ad is significantly higher than 
chance (.20), respectively, χ2 (1) = 5.83, p < .05; χ2 (1) = 8.28, p < .005. Also similarly, the 
accuracy of recall for the background color (M = .07) and the brand claim (M = .14) is not 
significantly different from chance (.20), respectively, χ2 (1) = 3.12, p > .05; χ2 (1) = 70, 
p > .40. However, in high-load condition, the accuracy of recall of all ad elements is not 
significantly different from chance, ps > .10. These findings jointly indicate that in the 
low/intermediate load condition, memory of the ad is significantly higher than that in high 
perceptual load. Especially, in low and intermediate load condition, people's memory of the 
brand name and main graphic is higher than their memory of brand names in high perceptual 
load. Figure 5 is an illustration of memory performances across conditions. 
 
3.5 Experiment 2 
    Experiment two (N = 61) was conducted in the same time period as experiment 1, 
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however the goal of experiment 2 was to look at cognitive load (low vs. high) as opposed to 
perceptual load. The procedure was largely the same as experiment 1 with the exception that 
the central tasks were two cognitive games. In the low-load condition, participants went 
through 32 trials (2 warm-up trials and 30 recorded trials; 12s each) of easy cognitive games; 
in the high-load condition, participants finished 32 trials (2 warm-up trials and 30 recorded 
trials; 12s each) of difficult cognitive games. See figure 2 for example of the cognitive load 
game manipulation. 
 
Results 
    A chi-square test is conducted to examine whether significant differences exist between 
affective responses in the two cognitive-load conditions. The affective preference score for 
the distracting ad in the high-load condition is not significantly different from that in the easy 
condition, χ2 (1) = .40, p > .50. Further goodness-of-fit tests demonstrate that: 1) under 
low-cognitive-load condition, the frequency of selecting the target distracting ad (N=15) is 
not significantly different from the expected value (N=16.5), χ2 (1) = .27, p > .50; 2) under 
high load condition, the frequency of selecting the target distracting ad (N=15) is not 
significantly different from the expected value (N=14), χ2 (1) = .14, p > .50. The result shows 
that liking of the distractor ad does not differ between the low and high cognitive-load 
conditions; nor does either condition evaluate the distracting ad as being preferred 
above/below chance. Therefore, hypothesis 7 is not supported. Evaluation of the distractor ad 
is fundamentally similar under high load and low load condition. Figure 6 is an illustration of 
affective responses across conditions. 
    A one-way repeated ANOVA demonstrates that the two novel ads in both low and 
high-load condition do not differ in familiarity ratings (ps>.20). The familiarity-related 
distracting ad is rated significantly higher in familiarity than the novel ads in both low (2.33 
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vs. 1.42) and high-load conditions (2.64 vs. 1.29), respectively, F(1, 32) = 6.58, p<.05; F(1, 
27) = 20.96, p<.001. However, familiarity ratings of the distractor ad are not significantly 
different between conditions (2.33 vs. 2.64), t(59) = -.756, p>.45. The result indicates that 
under both high and low cognitive load, people sufficiently encode the distractor ad and 
become more familiar with it compared with completely new ads. Therefore, hypothesis 8 is 
not supported. There is no significant difference between ad familiarity under low and high 
cognitive load condition. Figure 7 is an illustration of familiarity ratings across conditions. 
    Chi-square tests demonstrate no significant differences between memory performances 
under high vs. low cognitive load across elements of the memory-related distractor ad 
(ps > .15). Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests demonstrate similar but more specific results for 
each memory elements. In low-load condition, the accuracy of recall of the main graphic (M 
= .36) and the brand name (M = .45) of the memory-related distracting ad is significantly 
higher than chance (.20), respectively, χ2 (1) = 5.52, p < .05; χ2 (1) = 13.36, p < .001. The 
accuracy of recall for the background color (M = .21) and the brand claim (M = .27) is not 
significantly higher than chance (.20), respectively, χ2 (1) = .03, p > .50; χ2 (1) = 1.10, p > .20. 
In high-load condition, only the accuracy of recall of the main graphic (M = .43) of the 
memory-related distracting ad is significantly higher than chance (.20), χ2 (1) = 9.14, p < .005. 
The accuracy of recall for the background color (M = .11), the brand name (M = .29), and the 
brand claim (M = .18) is not significantly different from chance (.20), respectively, χ2 (1) = 
1.51, p > .20; χ2 (1) = 1.29, p > .20; χ2 (1) = .08, p > .50. Since difference in conditions does 
not lead to difference in memory performance, hypothesis 9 is not supported. The difference 
between memory performances in high and low cognitive load condition is insignificant. 
Figure 8 is an illustration of memory performances across conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
    In this study, we used interactive online games to test potential differences in load type 
on advertising. We also looked at the potential boundary conditions for devaluation of ads 
exposed while the viewer is selectively attending to something other than the ad (meaning 
that the non-goal relevant ad could be considered a distractor). Extending past work on 
devaluation, we used a new context (interactive game) and explored the role of memory more 
in-depth, particularly in terms of the individual parts of an ad. 
 Results reported here indicate that memory and familiarity of the distractor ads under low 
perceptual load is higher than under high perceptual load. This is in line with Lavie's (1995) 
proposal that in high perceptual load, attention largely focuses on the central perceptual task 
and almost no spare attention can be allocated to the distractors. Although memory and 
familiarity of the distractor ads are lower in high perceptual load, our first hypothesis that 
preference of the ad will be higher in high perceptual load was not supported; in fact, the 
opposite was found. This may suggest that memory and familiarity of a particular 
task-irrelevant ad is not indicative of or possibly even negatively associated with 
liking/preference of the ad. Particularly, we find that after ad exposure in the low load 
condition, people actually preferred the distractor ad more than a novel ad that had the same 
affective rating; whereas in the high load condition, people devalued the distractor ad 
compared with the novel ad.  
This dichotomous pattern was interesting in that in the low-load condition, a 
mere-exposure effect seemed to happen (Zajonc, 1968); whereas in the high-load condition, 
distractor devaluation took place. It is important to link this pattern back to the load 
manipulation. In the low-load condition, participants encountered a small set of shapes and 
were engaged in a very easy perceptual-matching task on which they did not need to fully 
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focus their attention on the task. In such low perceptual load, participants' encoding of the 
distractor banner ads might be similar to the pattern of encoding when the ads were the 
central visual targets. Therefore, in an advertising context, when people are engaged in low 
perceptual load, especially uncluttered scenes (e.g., visual searching in a concisely designed 
website; billboard in the middle of a highway through rural areas), their encoding of ads 
appearing near to the central task will be more complete than they were looking in a cluttered 
scene; their liking of the ad will also be higher. However, there was not simply an overall 
exposure effect because in the high-load condition, the game had much higher visual 
competition and participants were required to use perceptual-binding strategies to tease out 
irrelevant competitor patterns. Therefore, the distractor ads might act as a visual interference 
more than they did in low-load condition, which might subsequently result in devaluation. 
This finding is in line with Kiss et al.'s (2007) finding that when attention (as measured by 
EEG) was most strongly focused on a central task, devaluation for the peripheral distractors 
was likely also stronger. 
Interestingly, in our study, ad devaluation occurred even though participants were not 
explicitly able to remember the existence of the distractor (e.g., the mean familiarity rating 
for the distractor ad was not different from that of a completely novel ad; and the memory of 
individual elements of an exposed ad were not significantly higher than guessing). This 
corresponds to Raymond et al. (2003) proposal that distractor devaluation is largely 
unconsciously shaped. In an advertising context, when people are engaged in 
high-perceptual-load tasks (e.g., playing a game with complex visual settings; visual search 
in a cluttered website such as Facebook), people's memory and familiarity of the ad placed 
beside the task will likely be insufficiently encoded; whereas liking of the distracting ad will 
likely be lower than that of a completely novel ad. For advertisers and media planners, this 
indicates that the larger visual environment an ad is placed in could affect ad reception and 
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perception. This means that ad placement in visually cluttered ‘busy’ website is likely to 
induce devaluation and low recognition, especially when people's main purpose to visit this 
website is visual search. 
    While our introduction of perceptual load in advertising yielded interesting results, 
under the more commonly used cognitive load, there did not appear to be any differences 
between an exposed ad and a novel ad for either the high or low load condition. The 
hypothesis of how cognitive load influences memory, familiarity and evaluation of the 
distractor ads was built upon Lavie's (2010) postulation that cognitive (working memory) 
load leads to distractor interference. However, since Lavie operationalized cognitive load as 
as a secondary task imposed upon a primary attention task, she may have been finding effects 
related to increased task demands rather than just due to increased working memory demands. 
Additionally, conceptualizing cognitive load as a secondary task means that the task induces 
divided attention instead of selective attention. Our operationalization of cognitive load was 
different in that participants focused solely on the working memory task (memory game), 
allowing us to look at selective attention as we intended. What we observed from the data 
was that when cognitive load is the primary task, the difference between high and low load 
was nonexistent in terms of memory, with both conditions showing significant familiarity 
effects (above novel ads). However, while both high and low cognitive load games allowed 
for increased memory, no ad devaluation (or valuation) was observed in either cognitive load 
condition. Therefore, in an advertising context, it may make no difference whether the ad 
exposure occurs when people are engaged in high or low cognitive tasks (e.g., reading a news 
article vs. doing mathematics). 
    Another important point that we have made is that different kinds of load contribute to 
differences in memory, familiarity, and affective evaluation of ads. In advertising literature so 
far, the definition of "load" is unclear or even absent. Some studies use the term "information 
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load" when manipulating different levels of perceptual or cognitive load (e.g., Wright 1973; 
Goodwin & Edgar, 1980) without specifying or differentiating types of load. Second, some of 
the studies that focused on advertising effect when participants were involved in a central 
task used the term "task difficulty" to refer to task load. For example, Duff and Faber (2011) 
operationalized task difficulty by varying the requirement of working memory usage during a 
visual search task, meaning that perceptual load was likely also involved. Our research 
demonstrates that cognitive load and perceptual load have essential differences in 
determining people's affective and memory responses to the peripheral distractor ads. If a 
researcher manipulated a cognitive-load task without really thinking about what s/he were 
building on for ad devaluation, s/he might end up concluding no effects of devaluation and 
may lead to conflicting results. Therefore, we suggest that future research should clarify the 
type of task load (cognitive or perceptual) used when studying selective attention in 
advertising. 
    Our findings also contribute directly to ad placement strategy. When the central task is 
perceptually easy to process, ad placement near the task benefits the ad; when the central task 
is cluttered and requires additional perceptual attentional resources, ad placement near the 
task has a negative effect on ad preference. For cognitive tasks, especially working memory 
tasks (e.g., rehearsing information), load appears to make no difference. Therefore, no 
specific ad placement strategy is suggested when the central task is largely cognitive. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
    One of the limitations of this research is measuring memory, familiarity, and affective 
responses independently using different ads. This design is a barrier for associating the 
different outcomes with each other. Future research may examine the same ads using 
different subjects to make better associations between responses to different constructs (e.g., 
memory and affective responses). The second limitation is that we did not examine cognitive 
tasks as secondary tasks. According to Lavie (2010), cognitive tasks as a part of multitasking 
may exert influence on memory and affective judgment different from that when the tasks are 
of primary interest. Since media multitasking behaviors are increasing, thjs is an important 
potential way to think of cognitive load, though as we point out here, it does add in task 
demands beyond pure cognitive load. Thirdly, ad’s similarity with the task is not examined. 
Similarity between the distractor ads and the task is also an influential factor that helps 
determine the severity of distractor devaluation (Duff & Faber, 2010). However, perceptual 
similarity and cognitive similarity are not separated in most distractor devaluation research in 
advertising field. Duff and Faber (2010) find that distractor brands that are visually similar 
(similar color) to the task is rated more unfavorably than those that are not similar to the task. 
Thus, what they have tested is perceptual similarity rather than cognitive similarity. Future 
research can focus on exploring the relationship between different kinds of similarity on 
distractor devaluation. Fourth, emotional advertising contents may also exert influence on ad 
processing. Emotionally salient stimuli are more capable of attracting attention and hence 
improving encoding of the stimuli (Dolcos & Denkova, 2008). Future research may focus on 
how emotional and neutral ads differ in their influence on ad memory and affective 
evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
    Recent advertising research demonstrates that when ads are embedded beside a central 
task, people tend to ignore them when focusing on the task (Duff & Faber, 2011; Duff, 2009). 
We examined how people's evaluation, familiarity and memory of an ad differ when they 
were faced with interactive web games that differed in cognitive and perceptual load. We find 
that memory, familiarity, and evaluation of peripheral ads only declines with perceptual load. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
TABLE 1 
MEANS (SD) FROM PRETEST 1 
 
Load 
Manipulation 
Game 
Difficulty 
(Mean/SD) 
Game 
Enjoyment 
(Mean/SD) 
Game 
Cheeriness 
(Mean/SD) 
Attention 
Focus 
(Mean/SD) 
Game Finishing 
Rate 
(Percentage) 
Low Perceptual 
Load 
27.42 (25.24) 35.97 (24.18) 2.94 (1.40) 67.17 (25.48) 12% 
Intermediate 
Perceptual 
Load 
36.41 (30.00) 40.59 (32.98) 2.88 (1.50) 69.82 (27.46) 5.90% 
High 
Perceptual 
Load 
46.63 (25.90) 28.25 (29.60) 2.44 (1.67) 65.00 (32.29) 0% 
Low Cognitive 
Load 
25.88 (21.13) 38.06 (23.82) 3.19 (.98) 64.56 (27.66) 25% 
High Cognitive 
Load 
48.73 (24.77) 50.6 (30.99) 3.6 (1.40) 77.87 (23.00) 0% 
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TABLE 2 
MEANS OF EACH ADVERTISEMENT IN PRETEST 2 
 
Ad ID Liking Familiarity 
1  2.65  1.06  
2  2.81  1.31  
3  4.76  2.12  
4  2.71  1.07  
5  3.35  1.24  
6  3.41  1.59  
7  4.81  2.25  
8  4.59  2.59  
9  4.12  2.18  
10  2.33  1.07  
11  4.53  1.41  
12  3.88  2.06  
13  2.87  2.07  
14  2.76  1.59  
15  2.80  1.73  
16  4.07  2.07  
17  2.40  1.47  
18  3.44  1.56  
19  3.94  1.59  
20  5.19  1.25  
 
Note: Liking ratings are based on a 9-point Likert scale. Familiarity ratings are based on a 
5-point Likert scale. 
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TABLE 3 
MEANS (SD) FROM EXPERIMENT 1 & 2 
 
  Experiment 1 - Perceptual Load 
Experiment 2 - 
Cognitive Load 
  
Low 
Load 
Intermediate 
Load 
High 
Load 
Low 
Load 
High 
Load 
Advertisement Preference .74 .59 .30 .45  .54  
Familiarity Ratings - Target 
Ad 
2.55 
(1.73) 
2.07 (1.41) 
1.45 
(1.03) 
2.33 
(1.56) 
2.64 
(1.64) 
Familiarity Ratings - Novel 
Ad 1 
1.29 
(.59) 
1.03 (.18) 
1.09 
(.29) 
1.42 
(1.03) 
1.29 (.71) 
Familiarity Ratings - Novel 
Ad 2 
1.45 
(.92) 
1.31 (.66) 
1.24 
(.56) 
1.61 (.93) 1.46 (.96) 
Advertising Memory - 
Background Color 
.10 .07  .12  .21 .11  
Advertising Memory - 
Main Graphic 
.42  .38  .30  .36 .43  
Advertising Memory - 
Brand Names 
.45  .41  .15  .45  .29 
Advertising Memory - 
Brand Claims 
.19 .14  .15  .27  .18  
 
Note: Familiarity ratings are based on a 5-point Likert scale. Ad evaluation and memory 
performance (i.e., accuracy) are frequency data. Therefore, no standard deviations are 
provided. 
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FIGURE 1 
GAME STIMULI - PERCEPTUAL GAMES 
 
 
Note: 1. For the perceptual load game, participants click on shapes that appear in conjunction 
with each other; when two correctly connected shapes are clicked, they disappear. 2. The 
visual setting for the intermediate game and the difficult game is identical except that the rule 
for intermediate game is to find two adjacent identical patterns whereas the rule for the 
difficult game is to find two identical patterns with one pattern in between. 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
FIGURE 2 
GAME STIMULI - COGNITIVE GAMES 
 
 
Note: For the cognitive load game, participants click on two squares and the numbers are 
revealed before returning to plain squares. When two squares with matching numbers are 
correctly clicked, that pair stays ‘face up’ with the numbers. 
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FIGURE 3 
ADVERTISING STIMULI 
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FIGURE 4  
AFFECTIVE RESPONSES ACROSS CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 1 
(PERCEPTUAL LOAD) 
 
 
Note: The expected value is that 50 percent of people will select the distracting ad while 
another 50 percent of people will select the novel ad. This is because the distracting ad has 
the same affective rating as that of the novel ad. If participants are told to select one ad that 
they prefer when both ads are novel to them (i.e., without going through each condition), the 
expected outcome is that equal amount of participants will select either ad. 
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FIGURE 5  
FAMILIARITY RATINGS ACROSS CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 1 
(PERCEPTUAL LOAD) 
 
 
Note: The ratings are based on a 5-point Likert scale (1. Not at all familiar to 5. Extremely 
familiar). 
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FIGURE 6  
MEMORY PERFORMANCE ACROSS CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 1 
(PERCEPTUAL LOAD) 
 
 
Note: Participants were instructed to select the correct ad element from 5 choices. Therefore, 
the probability of guessing the correct answer is 20 percent, which is demonstrated as a red 
bar in the graph. 
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FIGURE 7  
AFFECTIVE RESPONSES ACROSS CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 2 
(COGNITIVE LOAD) 
 
 
Note: The expected value is that 50 percent of people will select the distracting ad while 
another 50 percent of people will select the novel ad. This is because the distracting ad has 
the same affective rating as that of the novel ad. If participants are told to select one ad that 
they prefer when both ads are novel to them (i.e., without going through each condition), the 
expected outcome is that equal amount of participants will select either ad. 
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FIGURE 8  
FAMILIARITY RATINGS ACROSS CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 2 
(COGNITIVE LOAD) 
 
 
Note: The ratings are based on a 5-point Likert scale (1. Not at all familiar to 5. Extremely 
familiar). 
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FIGURE 9 
 MEMORY PERFORMANCE ACROSS CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 2 
(COGNITIVE LOAD) 
 
 
Note: Participants were instructed to select the correct ad element from 5 choices. Therefore, 
the probability of guessing the correct answer is 20 percent, which is demonstrated as a red 
bar in the graph. 
 
